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Harrison and Wolf claim that interstate ‘wars are becoming more frequent’. This is an alarming 
claim deserving serious attention. It is also a highly surprising claim, since recent conflict research 
tends to find the opposite: incidences of violent conflict are becoming less frequent. We argue that 
Harrison and Wolf’s claim is incorrect. We show empirically that interstate wars are in fact 
becoming less frequent. Other data on tensions between states below war, such as the Interstate 
Crises Behavior data, also suggest a decline in conflict between states. We detail how Harrison and 
Wolf’s analysis is misleading, highlighting how their findings primarily arise as a likely artefact of 
their uncritical use of the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data, and explaining why MIDs 
cannot be interpreted as ‘wars’. Given that Harrison and Wolf’s basic premise is wrong, and wars 
are not becoming more frequent, we should be sceptical of their conclusions. We briefly revisit their
suggested explanations for why wars may become more frequent in light of what we know about 
long-term trends in warfare and research on interstate war.
In their recent article, Harrison and Wolf claim that interstate ‘[w]ars are becoming more frequent’.2 This is an alarming 
claim deserving serious attention. It is also a highly surprising claim, since recent conflict research tends to find the 
opposite: the incidence of violent conflict is declining.3
We argue that Harrison and Wolf’s claim is incorrect. We first show empirically that interstate wars are in fact becoming
less frequent. Moreover, we show that other data on tensions between states below war, such as the Interstate Crises 
Behavior data, also suggest a decline in conflict between states. We then detail how Harrison and Wolf’s analysis is 
misleading, highlighting how their findings primarily arise as a likely artefact of their uncritical use of the Militarized 
Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data, and explaining why MIDs cannot and should not be interpreted as ‘wars’. Given that 
Harrison and Wolf’s basic premise is wrong, and wars are not becoming more frequent, we should be sceptical of their 
conclusions. We revisit their suggested explanations for why wars may become more frequent in light of what we know 
about long-term trends in warfare and research on interstate war.
I
Trends in warfare and the frequency of war over time should in principle be relatively easy to assess empirically, given 
data and agreement on definitions and the underlying source material. There are a number of datasets in interstate wars, 
which differ in temporal coverage, underlying population of state actors that may be involved of conflict, and typologies
of conflict. Prominent examples include the Correlates of War (COW) data on war,4 the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset,5 and the Expanded War Data.6 Most of these datasets on war, however, share a common underlying definition 
of interstate war as armed conflict between two states involving at least 1,000 battle-deaths. By contrast, the Militarized 
Interstate Disputes dataset used by Harrison and Wolf does not have a minimum casualties threshold as a criterion for 
something to be considered a dispute.7 Hence, these data do not satisfy the conventional definition of what constitutes a 
‘war’, unless one also would like to include common figurative uses of the term such as the ‘war on drugs’ or latent 
conflicts such as the Cold War. One may of course disagree with the conventional definition of war. However, Harrison 
and Wolf do not offer any discussion of why the standard definition of war is not appropriate or offer an alternative 
definition of war. Although we concur with Diehl et al. that the MID dataset can be helpful in addressing many central 
questions in the study of international conflict, it is a mistake to assume that MIDs are synonymous with wars.8 We will 
return to this issue later, but first review what conventional war data actually suggest about the frequency of interstate 
wars over time.
II
We examine the recently updated interstate war data from the Expanded War Dataset.9 Much of the recent research on 
the decline in violent conflict also focuses on civil war, but we follow the example of Harrison and Wolf in restricting 
our analysis to interstate conflict. The Expanded War Dataset is based largely on the Correlates of War data, but uses a 
less Eurocentric definition of the population of independent states, especially for the nineteenth century.10 Many states, 
such as China and South American states, are not included as system members in the COW data for much of the 
nineteenth century, since they did not have diplomatic relations with the main European powers. As a result, all wars 
involving these states when they were not considered ‘system members’ are excluded from the COW interstate war 
data, leading to an undercount of interstate wars. By contrast, the Expanded War Dataset includes a number of conflicts 
between independent states that were not recognized as interstate wars in the COW data. We will revisit the implications
of divergent definitions of the population of states in greater detail later. The Expanded War Dataset has been updated 
beyond 2007 (the end year for the V4.0 COW data) to 2010, based on the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. 
However, we note that there are no interstate events that claim more than 1,000 lives over this period, although civil 
wars do occur at this level of severity.
Figure 1 displays the total number of ongoing interstate wars by calendar year as a black bar for each annual count. 
Figure 1 shows that interstate wars are relatively infrequent events, and very rarely have more than three interstate wars 
been ongoing in any single year. Moreover, there are many years without any interstate wars. Remarkably, no interstate 
wars at all are recorded for the period 2004–10.
In our view, figure 1 suggests, if anything, a declining trend in interstate war. However, since humans are good at seeing
patterns where none may exist, it is helpful to have a more formal criterion for what constitutes a trend and how to 
assess frequency over time. Harrison and Wolf use linear regression of time on the number of disputes, and we adopt the
same approach here.11 Our aim is primarily to provide descriptive material about trends in wars over time rather than to 
decompose the time series into stochastic or systematic components that can possibly be attributed to specific 
covariates.12 However, like Harrison and Wolf, we also control for the number of states in the world, as the number of 
possible wars between states arguably could be a function of the interaction opportunities between states.
We first estimate a linear regression of time on the number of wars. This yields a negative but not statistically 
significant coefficient on year.13 The implied prediction from this model is shown as a thick dashed line in figure 1. This
suggests a declining rather than increasing linear trend over the entire period. However, the distribution of wars does not
really suggest a uniform linear trend over the entire period. Linear regression by construction assumes a constant trend 
of time, which may not be appropriate here if there are structural shifts, or distinct trends in different phases over the 
time periods. We find that a simple non-linear specification based on time and time squared fits the data much better 
(R2 = 0.145 versus R2 = 0.02 for the linear time trend).14 With a cubic time specification, all the coefficients for the time 
terms become statistically significant, and the coefficient for the number of states also becomes significant. The implied
results from this model—shown by the dotted line in figure 1—suggest a curvilinear trend, where the number of wars 
increased up to the second half of the nineteenth century, then declined, again increasing with a new smaller peak 
around the period of decolonialization in the 1960s, and finally decreasing to an unprecedented low in the current period
after the end of the Cold War.
Finally, since any parametric estimate of time will be sensitive to model specification, we present a non-parametric 
approach to assessing trends over time in the data, using a locally weighted regression estimate from the data on the 
numbers of wars over time. In figure 1 we display as a thin dashed line a LOWESS smoother, using a span of 0.2.15 This
suggests a curvilinear trend similar to our cubed time specification, and the shape generally tracks our cubic regression-
based estimate closely, especially in the postwar decline in conflict and in the increase of wars up to German unification
in the nineteenth century.
In our view, the trends displayed by the data in figure 1, as well as the various estimates discussed above, support the 
premise opposite to that of Harrison and Wolf, namely that there is a clear decline in the frequency of interstate wars. 
Some other data sources on interstate wars report slightly different absolute numbers of wars—for instance, the COW 
project has reclassified some interstate wars in the nineteenth century as ‘extra-systemic’, since one or more of the 
states were not recognized by the UK or France, and the Uppsala data are available only after 1945. However, these and
other sources all suggest declining trends in the frequency of conflict over recent times similar to figure 1. As such, it is 
very difficult to see how the data on interstate war can be reconciled with Harrison and Wolf’s claim of an increasing 
frequency of interstate war. The fact that other data sources on interstate war tend to give similar results, and in the 
opposite direction, should raise suspicion about the data examined by Harrison and Wolf and whether these can be 
considered evidence for an increasing frequency of interstate war.
III
In fairness, Harrison and Wolf do acknowledge that ‘many indicators of interstate conflict have been flat or declining 
for decades or longer … [including] the number of wars in each year since 1816, the number of military fatalities in 
each year since 1946, and the annual probability of bilateral interstate conflict since 1950’. However, the authors claim 
that the number of countries at war ‘has moved persistently in the wrong direction’.16 They refer to findings presented 
by Hewitt as evidence for this claim.17 Hewitt’s analysis is not limited to interstate wars and actually includes the civil 
wars in the UCDP data as well as conflicts below the 1,000 battle-deaths threshold. To examine empirically whether 
Harrison and Wolf’s claim is consistent with conventional data on interstate war, we plot the number of participants in 
interstate wars in the Expanded War Dataset in figure 2. Although the absolute number of participants looks somewhat 
different from the count of interstate wars, we find a similar decline here over the twentieth century. Thus, contrary to 
Harrison and Wolf’s claim, looking at participants in interstate war provides no evidence for an increasing frequency of 
interstate war. We conclude that the declining frequency in war in recent years holds irrespective of whether one looks 
at interstate wars or the number of participants in interstate wars.
IV
One might legitimately argue that the risk of war should be assessed not just in terms of the actual full-scale wars that 
we observe, but also in terms of the high-risk situations that plausibly could have escalated to become large wars, such 
as the Cuban Missile Crisis. Perhaps the dire warnings sounded by Harrison and Wolf reflect an increase in such crises 
with a high potential for war, even if they have tended not to escalate to war?
For reasons that we will detail later we believe that the MID data are inappropriate as a measure of the incidence of 
such close calls. However, the so-called Interstate Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset provides one source that allows us to 
consider such situations empirically. According to Brecher and Wilkenfeld, interstate crises are defined by ‘a change in 
type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive … interactions between two or more states, with a heightened 
probability of military hostilities’, which is consistent with the notion of close calls that may not ultimately result in 
war.18 Figure 3 displays the number of ICBs for the period 1918–2007. These data again suggest a declining frequency 
of interstate crises, with the decline from the peak possibly even preceding the Cold War.
V
The fact that common data sources on interstate war suggest a declining trend makes it puzzling that Harrison and Wolf 
can claim to find an increase in the frequency of interstate wars for 1870–2000. To understand this, it is instructive to 
examine in more detail the actual data that they use, namely the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute
(MID) data.
VI
Jones, Bremer, and Singer define militarized interstate disputes as referring to ‘united historical cases of conflict in 
which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the 
government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state’.19 This definition highlights 
the fact that the MID dataset is primarily intended to supplement the COW project’s existing data on wars through 
additional information on disputes short of war. Many researchers think of the disputes data as a superset of contentious 
interstate events that have some potential for escalation to war (although, as we will discuss in greater detail later, some 
researchers question whether this is appropriate). MIDs can have five levels of hostility: (1) no militarized action; (2) 
threat to use force; (3) display of force; (4) use of force; (5) war, that is, events with more than 1,000 deaths.
Harrison and Wolf suggest that it makes sense to analyse trends in conflictual interstate events with a less restrictive 
hostility level than the conventional threshold for war, since large-scale wars are so rare.20 However, we strongly believe
that it is not warranted to consider disputes as ‘wars’, and it is highly problematic to assume that trends in MIDs provide
a suitable basis for conclusion about trends in wars. In their analyses, Harrison and Wolf exclude MIDs with a hostility 
level below 3, but our argument also holds for disputes with a hostility level of 3 or 4 as neither of these can be 
considered to be as severe as war. In particular, we note that the ‘use of force’ category in the MID data (that is, level 4) 
includes events such as fishing disputes where one country’s coastguard seizes a vessel from another state. Only 313, or 
about 20 per cent, of the 1,553 MIDs that involved ‘use of force’ entail any recorded fatalities. Therefore, MIDs 
considered to include ‘use of force’ hardly correspond to what most people have in mind when they talk about interstate
wars. Moreover, the ‘use of force’ category is actually the modal category in the MID data (constituting about two-
thirds of all MID events), and less than 5 per cent of the MIDs have hostility levels less than 3.
Since the entire basis for Harrison and Wolf’s claim that ‘[w]ars are increasingly frequent, and the trend has been 
steadily upward since 1870’21 rests on the inclusion of these events, it is essential to examine some of the MIDs with 
hostility levels of 3 and 4 to see whether these can plausibly be considered wars. For example, we have a level 4 event 
(that is, use of force) in 1997 between the US and Canada. It is worth quoting the COW description of this event in full:
Between May 25, 1997 and May 27, 1997 Canada seized four American fishing boats in the Pacific 
Northwest after salmon quota negotiations between the two states broke down. Canada has 
repeatedly charged the United States with over-fishing in the area. All four boats were released after
their Captains appeared in Canadian court and paid a fine.22
In our view, a three-day dispute, ultimately resolved by fishermen paying fines, falls a long way short of war, and has 
little or no potential for escalation to interstate war. Indeed, there is no evidence here of any direct involvement by the 
US government, and we do not believe that any serious observer would consider a war between the US and Canada 
particularly likely in the wake of events of this type. More generally, all seizures of foreign vessels by a coastguard are 
considered ‘use of force’ in the MID data, although in practice it is rare for governments to be directly involved in such 
events.23 The management of international fisheries is an interesting issue in its own right, but not what most people 
have in mind when they think of war. Harrison and Wolf see the difference between MID categories as a difference in 
the degree of conflict; we see a clear difference in kind between wars and events short of war in the MID data.
One might argue that it is questionable whether such conflicts ought to be included in the MID data since they do not 
clearly involve states or agents sanctioned by states.24 However, it is incumbent on researchers to examine the data that 
form the basis for their claims and recognize that the MID data include many such events. Cohen and Weeks argue that 
approximately 7 per cent of all MIDs between 1945 and 2001 are interactions between coastguards and fishing vessels 
not linked to a demand by the home state, and Mitchell and Prins estimate that such fishing disputes constitute about 25 
per cent of all the MIDs between democracies.25 By contrast, the ICB data include only two fishing disputes (ICB 254 
and 263, the so-called ‘cod wars’ between Iceland and the UK), which unlike most fishing disputes did include explicit 
demands by state leaders.
Harrison and Wolf’s analysis also included disputes with a hostility level of 3, involving ‘display of force’. However, a 
perusal of the actual events included in these categories suggests that these do not seem to correspond with what 
Harrison and Wolf discuss as ‘wars’. As a representative example, consider the narrative for dispute ID 4169: 
‘Mozambique condemns Swaziland for a border violation. Swaziland pledges to “better relations”. No further details 
available’. In this case, the only evidence for the display of force appears to be the condemnation by Mozambique, and 
there does not seem to be any desire by Swaziland to escalate the issue. Such events may be interesting in their own 
right, but we do not think this can be considered a plausible ‘war’ in the conventional sense of the term.
VII
Aside from the issue of whether a militarized dispute should be considered a ‘war’ and whether all disputes ought to be 
given the same weight, the number of disputes counted in a given year obviously depends on whether specific incidents 
are considered as separate disputes or form part of an overall dispute, based on the underlying issue. To use a specific 
example, in the second so-called ‘cod war’, the Icelandic coastguard pursued 16 UK fishing vessels in January 1973. 
Should this be considered 16 distinct disputes, or part of the same dispute, as they all arise over a related controversy 
about the status of particular waters as domestic or international?
Harrison and Wolf count disputes in the MID data, but do not seem fully to have understood the criteria for 
distinguishing whether individual events count as a separate dispute or part of another dispute, and how these criteria 
are related to the severity of the dispute. The building block in the MID data is the concept of an incident or individual 
confrontation. The criteria for aggregating incidents into disputes, and for determining whether an incident is a new 
dispute or an incident in another dispute in the MID data, are complex. But they hinge on whether incidents are deemed 
to concern the same contentious issue, to occur in the same location, and to fall within six months of one another.26 
However, the MID data explicitly stop counting new events once something is deemed a war, even if these involve 
other issues.27
One implication of the MID coding rules is that more severe events are likely to give rise to fewer ‘disputes’. Hence, 
they will be given systematically less weight in Harrison and Wolf’s count of disputes. In particular, large-scale wars 
such as the First World War and Second World War constitute a single event in the COW MID dataset (IDs 257 and 258 
respectively). By contrast, less serious militarized disputes such as those over the Spratly Islands, an archipelago in the 
South China Sea constituting approximately five square kilometres of land (presented in figure 4), are held to constitute 
12 separate events. To give a sense of what is involved, we quote the narrative for MID 4329: ‘Philippines increased 
patrols in the Spratlys as a result of the sighting of unspecified Chinese and Vietnamese vessels. Although some 
officials noted the sightings were part of “regular movement” in the disputed archipelago, the Philippine armed forces 
ordered increased patrols in the vicinity of Pagasa’.28
Without belittling the importance of the Spratly Islands conflict, it seems questionable whether these events merit being 
counted as 12 wars or 6 times more important than two of the most bloody wars in human history, based on the absolute
number of casualties. In our view, the inverse relationship between dispute numbers and severity makes the count of 
MIDs a questionable source for claims about global trends in conflict.
Our analyses so far have counted the number of wars or events. Harrison and Wolf break up events into bilateral 
disputes, where a given conflict could include one or more pairs of states confronting one another militarily. Although it
may be useful to consider pairwise interactions within wars in dyadic analyses for many research questions, we believe 
that Harrison and Wolf’s approach is problematic for assessing global trends and fails to recognize the structure of the 
MID data and its implications for dyadic analyses. It is highly unclear why the number of pairwise interactions should 
be preferred as a measure of the frequency of wars over the number of events, or other measures that also consider the 
magnitude of war such as the number of participants or the number of casualties in wars.29 If one insists on using dyadic
data, then it must be recognized that the MID data simply list all participants on side A and B on a conflict, which does 
not necessarily mean that all states interacted or confronted each other militarily. For example, although Finland was on 
the opposite side of the UK and the US in the Second World War, neither of the states confronted each other militarily. 
The UK only declared war on Finland once the USSR joined the Allied side since Finland was already at war with the 
USSR, and the US never declared war on Finland. Neither the US nor the UK engaged in military action against Finnish
armed forces. International conflict scholars are aware that simply creating dyads of all states listed as participants to 
disputes generates problems of ‘false dispute dyads’, inaccurate hostility levels, and incorrect starting dates.30 
Researchers who wish to analyse the active dyadic participants normally use Maoz’s dyadic version of the MID data to 
avoid such problems.31 Finally, if one wishes to aggregate dyadic data to assess global trends, then it would seem 
reasonable to consider the number of dyadic disputes relative to the number of dyads in the system. However, Harrison 
and Wolf acknowledge that the proportion of dyads in conflict has declined, even using the problematic dyadic data on 
all participants based on the standard MID data.32
VIII
The MID data may be plagued by a number of selection problems, and we will return to the issue of source availability 
biases later. However, one selection problem is built into the data by the construction. The MID data explicitly build on 
the COW project’s delineation of states in the international system, documented most comprehensively by Singer and 
Small.33 This makes a comparison of counts of MIDs over time in the world at large highly problematic, in ways that do
not seem to be appreciated by Harrison and Wolf.
The specific criteria for system membership in the COW project change over time. Prior to 1920, in general, members 
of the interstate system must, first, have a population above 500,000, and second, be ‘sufficiently unencumbered by 
legal, military, economic, or political constraints to exercise a fair degree of sovereignty and independence’, in practice 
assessed by whether states have formal diplomatic relations with Britain and France at or above the level of chargé 
d’affaires in the capital city. After 1920, Singer and Small classified ‘a nation … as a system member if it either: (a) was
a member of the League of Nations or the United Nations at any time during its existence, or (b) met the half-million 
population minimum and received diplomatic missions from any two (rather than the specific two) major powers’.34
As noted by Gleditsch and Ward, the COW criteria generate a list of system members at odds with common perceptions 
of independent states and difficulties for comparison over time. Many countries appear on the COW system 
membership list long after they were commonly regarded as independent states. Latin American states appear on the 
COW list many years after they achieved independence from Spain and long after they were active participants in 
international interactions. Many states that were never colonized (for example, China, Iran, and Japan) first appear on 
the list at seemingly arbitrary points, often just in time to be involved in a war with central European powers. Finally, 
after the Cold War we see a rush by many small microstates such as Palau (population barely 20,000) to join the UN, 
leading these to become included as system members in the COW list. Gleditsch and Ward propose an alternative list of 
independent states based on whether a unit, first, has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory; 
second, is considered a distinct entity by local actors or the state on which it is dependent on; and third, has a population
greater than 250,000.35 As can be seen from figure 5, the COW list includes substantially fewer states than Gleditsch 
and Ward’s list in the nineteenth century.
Do these differences in the definition of independent states make a difference for our conclusions about the frequency of
war? For interstate wars the answer is clearly yes. Since the COW system list excludes many states without diplomatic 
relations with the European powers from the population of states up to 1920, it also excludes a number of states that 
actually engaged in interstate wars. As a result, the COW interstate war data exclude conflicts that normally would be 
considered conflicts between sovereign states and relegates these to another dataset on ‘extrasystemic conflicts’. An 
example is the 1836–9 War of the Confederation, between the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation on the one hand, and 
Chile on the other. Since the three states involved were not acknowledged by COW as existing until the end of the 
conflict (or in the case of Bolivia, not until nine years later), the conflict is not included in the COW interstate war data. 
Figure 6 shows the interstate war data in the Expanded War Data, based on the Gleditsch and Ward state list, and the 
number of these conflicts deemed extrasystemic in the COW war data. As can be seen, the share of excluded wars is 
substantial in the nineteenth century. An examination of the interstate war data from the COW project would suggest an 
increasing trend over the nineteenth century. However, this is to a large extent a function of the restrictive initial criteria 
for identifying states and changes over time, excluding many wars considered interstate by conventional criteria.
It is difficult to evaluate empirically the extent to which the restrictive and changing criteria for recognizing states as 
system members may affect trends in the MID data, since we do not have any comparable list of the disputes involving 
states not recognized in the COW list. However, based on what we know about interstate wars, the problem seems 
significant, and in our view makes these data unsuitable for comparisons over time.
IX
Many other researchers have shown that the MID dataset is one of the few sources that does not show a decline in 
conflict after the end of the Cold War.36 There is no universally accepted explanation for why this may be the case, but a
number of different suggestions have been proposed. It is of course possible that there is a decline in violent conflict in 
general, and at the same time we see a dramatic increase in minor disputes or contentious issues that do not escalate to 
significant violence. In our view, this is unlikely, and we believe a more plausible explanation is that the lower-level 
militarized disputes tend to be severely undercounted the further back we go in time, due to systematic differences in 
the availability of sources. A perusal of the narratives of the MID data suggests that many of the recent recorded MIDs 
are relatively obscure. It is very difficult to find any information on many events in the most recent update of the MID 
data. Given the explosion of available information sources over the last decade, it seems less likely that one would be 
able to find consistent documentation for minor militarized events such as fishing disputes for earlier periods of time. 
This is likely to give rise to a systematic downward bias the further back one goes in time. We surmise that much of the 
apparent increase in MIDs is likely to be a result of greater media coverage over time. Although it is difficult to evaluate
such selection problems empirically, we submit that such selection problems are highly probable and likely to make the 
MID data very problematic for claims about global trends over time. Finally, even if we disregard the likely selection 
biases leading to a large number of lower-level MIDs in more recent years and if it actually is correct that we see an 
increasing frequency of contentious issues and disputes, the MID data still indicate that few of these escalate to lethal 
violence. Hence, the data hardly suggest an ‘increasing frequency of war’. Above all, they suggest a marked tendency 
for disputes to be less likely to escalate to war over time. This does not seem consistent with Harrison and Wolf’s claim 
about an increasing frequency of war. Indeed, the observed decline in war is even more remarkable if there actually is 
an increase in lower-level disputes and a lower rate of escalation to war.
X
In fairness to Harrison and Wolf, many of the issues and problems in the MID data discussed above 
remain unappreciated by conflict researchers, who often use information on disputes to make 
inferences about wars, assuming that the causes of war mirror the predictors of disputes. However, 
research seeking to account for MIDs and escalation to war tends to have a very different focus than
Harrison and Wolf, and in our view the problems identified here may not apply to the same extent in
these studies.
Existing studies rarely use these data for assessing global trends in conflict between states over time, but typically 
examine outbreaks of disputes at the level of individual dyads or pairs of states, and how the risk of a dispute may be 
accounted for by differences in various characteristics of the states in a dyad (for example, level of development, 
contentious claims, or political institutions) as well as possible changing characteristics of the international system 
(such as the distribution of power or the presence/absence of international institutions). Controlling for dyadic 
characteristics and comparing disputes for the same dyad profile can in part address some of the problems arising from 
systematic biases in aggregate analysis over time. Harrison and Wolf review some of the suggested explanations of 
factors influencing the risk of war. However, they examine only the aggregate distributions of these features at the 
global level, rather than how the characteristics of individual dyads influence differences in the risk of disputes. This 
disregards completely how inferences focusing on aggregate characteristics summed over individual units are 
susceptible to a host of ecological fallacy problems, outlined by Robinson and later popularized by Singer in the study 
of international war.37 Furthermore, most analyses of the MID data examine only the post-1945 period, hence avoiding 
the problems of the changes in membership criteria of the COW system after 1945.
XI
On the basis of our analysis, we take issue with Harrison and Wolf’s claim to find an increasing trend in interstate wars. 
Indeed, we believe that a more reasonable review of the data suggests the opposite, and that wars are becoming less 
frequent. We have detailed why we do not find the empirical material presented by Harrison and Wolf to be compelling.
Harrison and Wolf proceed from their assertion that war is increasing to speculate on the possible causes in the latter 
part of their article. We believe that their initial premise that such an increasing trend exists is misguided, and Harrison 
and Wolf’s arguments strike us as post hoc speculation to account for the alleged trend, rather than being derived from 
any explicit theoretical justification. We also believe that many of their claims ignore the potential ecological fallacies 
in assessing the generally dyadic arguments in existing research on interstate conflict with aggregate global data.38
More generally, however, any effort to assess and account for global trends in warfare must first start by recognizing 
what is encompassed by the available data, what sort of inferences they can and cannot support, and their possible 
limitations. In our view, the most plausible interpretation of the available evidence suggests that wars are declining, and 
that the possible increase in lower-level disputes (which may be an artefact of selection biases) if anything goes together
with a tendency for these to escalate to war less often. A more productive avenue for research on trends in conflict 
would be to consider what factors may explain why we observe these trends. There is a large literature on the thesis of 
the decline in violent conflict.39 We cannot aspire to provide new contributions within the scope of this article or even to
do full justice to the existing literature. However, we would like to offer some brief comments on why some of the key 
features highlighted by Harrison and Wolf may actually contribute to the decline in conflict and its severity.
Harrison and Wolf highlight the declining costs of destructive capacity and technologies as a permissive condition for 
conflict. In our view, although military technology probably has become relatively cheaper, the risk of war will depend 
on relative capabilities rather than the absolute costs of arms, and many of these decreases in costs apply to all countries
alike. The willingness to resort to war should depend on a country’s prospects of winning in a contest rather than just 
the costs of armaments per se. The likelihood of one country, A, prevailing in a dyadic contest with another country, B, 
can be thought of as a function of the ratio of their military capabilities. Hence, the fact that military capabilities 
become cheaper for A may not change the relative balance if they also become cheaper for B, and most researchers 
dispute that there is any simple direct relationship between the costs of armaments and the risk of conflict.40
Furthermore, Harrison and Wolf’s discussion of the costs of war focuses solely on expenditure on destructive capacity 
and completely neglects the costs of war in terms of the destruction caused by war and the opportunity costs of violent 
conflict. Any serious analysis of conflict must consider how the full costs of war shape the incentives of actors, and 
their incentives to reach alternative solutions to contentious issues without the use of violence.41 From a bargaining 
perspective, all wars must eventually come to an end, and if war is costly then the parties should have an incentive to 
reach an agreement reflecting the likely settlement after a war, without paying the costs of fighting the war. There is no 
reason to suspect that states no longer have contentious issues—indeed, one might expect that these have increased with
greater interaction and globalization. However, development, democratization, and capitalism may have made it easier 
for states to reach agreement, and avoid escalation to war, and more costly to fail to reach agreement. For example, 
existing research at the dyadic level suggests that democratic states are more likely to settle their disputes peacefully, 
possibly since they can externalize their internal dispute resolution mechanisms or delegate dispute arbitration to 
international institutions.42 Moreover, states with more trade and more extensive economic relations are likely to have 
higher opportunity costs from escalation to war and may have more opportunities to signal intent and reach resolution 
by means other than military force.43 The trend towards a decline in war may also be facilitated by important global 
macro-trends such as increases in education and urbanization, which have been shown to foster attitudes that make 
people less likely to glorify violence and more likely to seek rational compromise.44
We agree with Harrison and Wolf that much remains to be discovered about war and why it has changed over time, and 
that much additional research is needed. However, it would be a mistake to start this line of research with a false 
premise, misleadingly presented as an empirical fact.
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Figure 1.    Number of interstate wars
Notes: Grey bars: no. of interstate wars. The superimposed thick dashed line indicates the fitted 
values of a linear regression on time and the no. of states; the dotted line displays the fitted values 
from a regression with time, time squared, and the no. of states; and the thin dashed line indicates a 
non-parametric trend estimate for the no. of wars over time.
Figure 2.    Number of interstate war participants
Notes: Grey bars: no. of interstate war participants. The superimposed thick dashed line indicates 
the fitted values of a linear regression on time and the no. of states; the dotted line displays the fitted
values from a regression with time, time squared, and the no. of states; and the thin dashed line 
indicates a non-parametric trend estimate for the no. of interstate war participants over time.
Figure 3.    Number of interstate crises
Notes: Grey bars: no. of interstate crises. The superimposed thick dashed line indicates the fitted 
values of a linear regression on time and the no. of states; the dotted line displays the fitted values 
from a regression with time, time squared, and the no. of states; and the thin dashed line indicates a 
non-parametric trend estimate for the no. of interstate crises over time.
Figure 4.    The Spratly Islands
Note: This is an archipelago composed of less than five square kilometres of land, but representing 
six times more MIDs than the First and Second World Wars combined.
Figure 5.    Number of independent states
Notes: Dotted line: according to the COW system membership list; solid line: Gleditsch and Ward’s 
list of independent states (Gleditsch and Ward, ‘Revised list’).
Figure 6.    Number of interstate wars
Notes: Black area: no. of interstate wars in the Expanded War Data (black area); grey area: shares of
these wars considered extrasystemic by the COW system.
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